This week we will talk about definitions in a new way, through the notion of “operationalization”. You’ll see this concept a few times in the book, and it means the process by which you translate (i.e. “operationalize”) an abstract concept such as democracy into a measurable number. We will walk through this process in class, but you should think about it before hand.
First, think about what ‘democracy’ as a regime type is? What constitutes a democracy? You can likely think of multiple definitions, so the follow-up question is: which definition(s) do you want to use? And this leads you to ask: for what use? Try to figure out what the authors’ objectives are, and consequently how they define democracy. What are the benefits of this approach? What are the drawbacks? Did the authors do the best they could? Could they have tried something else?
1 comments:
I think the authors said it best when they write: "Almost all normatively desireable aspects of political life, and sometimes even of social and economic life, are credited as definitional features of democracy" (14). Hence, I find it hard personally to provide a precise definition of democracy that would stand the scrutiny of political scientists. But, I think a combination of aspects that the authors mention, including the one they used and many others they state they did use, can be a working definition of "democracy". If I had to pick my "Top Three" of the necessary attributes, I would say that a democracy must:
1) Have multiparty, competitive elections that are uncertain as to results, irreversible, and repeatable, for the chief executive and legislatural functions of government (a summary of the requirements they use).
2) Have the practiced purpose of being representative of and responsive to the security, economic, and social interests of citizens.
3) Protect basic civil rights, most importantly: to rights of property, free assembly/speech, and due process of law.
I think the use of my Top Three model is basically similar to the authors' purpose, to be able to draw a distinction inside of the gray zone that separates "true" democracy and dictatorship. Only by having this distinction can one compare a set of democracies both between states in the set and against the set of dictatorships. Further, this is not a subjective opinion on what an ideal democracy should be, but only a basic definition of what, realistically, is considered a democracy in the real world today.
I think that the authors do an admirable job of arriving at a useable definition for their purpose of comparing the economic growth of democracies and dictatorships. By choosing just the first factor, they allow enough states into the set of democracies for an effective comparison; especially, they allow poorer, developing states with new democracies to join with the traditionally considered industrialized democracies (places with snow!)(7). They have also paid attention to limiting their own normative views on an ideal democracy by stating clear, simple guidelines. Looking at my list, I see that some of the aspects I put in, such as "responsiveness" or "right of property", may be subjective and much more controversial for a working definition.
One possible drawback of selecting based only on competitive elections is that some political theories, both modern and classical, may disagree with this definition. Since democracy is impossible to define with a normative judgment on what aspects it should have in its ideal state, few political scientists would claim that they have the perfect definition. But, some may add additional requirements to this own requirement, and may exclude some of the selected states as not genuine democracies based on failing their expanded definitions. This may add to controversy over the authors' findings in their comparison of economies, and on their models of the growth of democracy. But, I do believe that the simplicity of their model reduces the normative influence, and greatly eases statistical inference by reducing states to just two categories, hence making their definition probably the best for this work.
One final note is that I believe one more aspect should be placed on their list of possible requirements for democracy. The constitutional protection of minority rights against the majority, I believe, is important in defining a genuine (or liberal) democracy. Without constitutional or legal guarantees for people whose economic or social interests clash with those of the majority, fairly elected governments can still effectively deprive some people of basic rights. These types of "illiberal" democracies often occur when ascriptive characteristics (religion, race, etc.) create societal cleavages. One excellent example of this type is the current situation in Iraq, where the Sunni minority is in danger of persecution and possible liquidation or removal by the elected Shiite majority.
See you soon!
Yang Li
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